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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
1). Issue. Did the Court error in reducing the appraised value of CL 
Welding when the parties had stipulated to the appraisal as the appropriate value to be 
given for each of the items of real property and as the proper value for each of the 
businesses? 
i. Determinative law. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 
Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 
ii. Standard of review. 
The Trial Court's property division and evaluation will be disturbed only when 
there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderance against the findings, or a senous 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 
4 
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176 (Utah Appeals 2002) 
ISSUE II 
2). Issue, Did the Court error in reducing the value of CL Welding 
based upon the assumption that Mr. Batty was an integral part of the business and that it 
was through his welding skill and operational skills that gave additional value to that 
business when the appraisal was an "asset based appraisal", where the appraiser 
specifically stated that he was not awarding any additional value to the assets for 
intangible assets or good will and particularly when the parties had agreed to the values 
as set out in the appraisals. 
i. Determinative law. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 
Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 
ii. Standard of review. 
The Trial Court's property division and evaluation will be disturbed only when 
there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderance against the findings, or a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
176 (Utah Appeals 2002) 
ISSUE III 
3). Issue. Did the Court error in justifying the reduction in the value of 
CL Welding by ordering that Mr. Batty pay the second mortgage on the home and then 
obligate Mrs. Batty to reimburse Ms. Batty for the principal payments he makes towards 
the second mortgage out of the equity of the home. 
i. Determinative law. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 
Bradford v. Bradford. 993 P.2d 887 
ii. Standard of review. 
The Trial Court's property division and evaluation will be disturbed only when 
there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderance against the findings, or a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 
176 (Utah Appeals 2002) 
ISSUE IV 
4). Issue. Did the court err in failing to consider the parties monthly 
6 
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expenses in making its determination of Alimony, 
i. Determinative law. 
Rehne v. Rehne, 974 P.2d 306 (1999 Utah Appeals 41) 
ii. Standard of review. 
"In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court 
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient 
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the 
marriage." Rehn v. Rehn. 1999 UT App 41, % 6, 974 P.2d 306; see Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(7)(aXi)-(iv) (Supp. 1999). [FN9] "If these factors have been considered, ' "we will 
not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as 
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." * "Childs v. Chi Ids, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1998) (omitting citations). 
ISSUE V 
5). Issue. Did the court err in only awarding $ 1,000 per month in 
Alimony based upon a 26 year marriage, after finding that Mr. Batty's gross monthly 
income to be $9,200 and Mrs. Batty's income to be $1,666. 
i. Determinative law. 
Rehne v. Rehne, 974 P.2d 306 (1999 Utah Appeals 41) 
7 
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ii. Standard of review. 
"In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court 
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient 
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the 
marriage." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, f 6, 974 P.2d 306; see Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(7)(a)(i)-(jv) (Supp. 1999). [FN9] "If these factors have been considered, ' "we will 
not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as 
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." ' " Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1998) (omitting citations). 
The preservation of the issues of marital asset division and alimony was preserved 
in the following portion of the Trial Transcript: 
THE COURT: Why don't we hear from counsel as to then the 
issues that are involved. I guess the primary issues are division of marital 
property; what might be marital property; the post nuptial agreement on the 
Fly shop. As I understand it, there's one child now that is under minority; 
. is that correct? And I guess, attorney's fees, alimony. What else: 
MR. ALLRED: That is about it. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. SNYDER: That's about it. 
(R:373 page 5, lines 14-22) 
8 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-35(8)(a) states: 
The Court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to an increase 
and the payors spouses skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action having been commenced in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court by the filing of a Petition by Lori D. Batty on January 16, 2002. (R: 3-8). 
Temporary orders were entered pursuant to an Order to Show Cause held April 
16, 2002. (R: 44-45). The issues were heard before the Honorable John R. Anderson at 
a one day Bench Trial held on the 14th day of June, 2004. (R: 251). The matter was taken 
under advisement and a written ruling was issued by the Court on July 6, 2004. (R: 246-
251). 
9 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted to the Court by counsel 
for Mrs. Batty on September 20, 2004. (R: 256-275). 
Counsel for Mr. Batty filed an objection to the entry of the proposed findings on 
September 21. ?n<M (R; 270-295). 
The Court ruled on the objections to the Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce 
on the 28th of September, 2004 ruling that the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions o1 
Law and Decree of Divorce filed by Mrs. Batty were a more accurate reflection of the 
Court's ruling. (R: 327). 
The signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were 
entered by the Court on September 20, 2004. (R: 256-275). 
Notice of Appeal and Bond on Appeal were filed in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court on October 20, 2004 | R: 328-331). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lori Batty and Clark Batty were married on Decembu I, i 977. (R:373, page 19, 
L: 8-9). At the time of the marriage the parties had just recently graduated from high 
school. Lori Batty was 18 years of age when she got married and Clark Batty was 19 
years of age. (R:373, page 19, lines 12-17). At the time of the trial held on June 14, 
2004, the parties had been married for 26 years. (R:373, page 19, lines 10-11). 
10 
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The parties are the parents of three children. (R:373, page 20, lines 17-18). At the 
time of trial, the parties oldest daughter had reached majority and was married. (R:373, 
page 21, lines 3-7). Timothy James Batty the parties' next oldest child was 19 years of 
age and had just graduated from high school just a couple of weeks prior to the trial. 
(R:373, page 21, lines 12-15). 
The parties have one daughter who is still a minor bom May 8, 1990 and was 14 
years of age at the time of trial. (R:373, page 21, lines 22- page 22, lines 2). 
The parties had acquired three large assets during the marriage namely the marital 
home located at 1819 North 3000 West in Vernal, Utah. (R:373 page 18, lines 6); a 
welding business entitled C.L. Welding, Inc. (R:373, page 28, lines - page 29, lines 11); 
and a fly fishing store called Big Foot Fly Shop located at 38 North 400 West, Vernal, 
Utah. (R:373, page 43, lines 5-21). 
At the commencement of the Trial, the parties stipulated to the entry of appraisals 
completed on the home and respective businesses set out in the trial transcript as follows: 
MR. SNYDER: I think we've stipulated to the appraisals of 
both parties' businesses and updated appraisals of my client's business. 
Oh, and the appraisal of the parties' home. 
MR. ALLRED: Yes, your Honor. We have four appraisals that 
Dale Cameron did. The parties own a home, they own two businesses; one 
is a welding business that Mr. Batty operates called C.L. Welding, the other 
is Big Foot Fly Shop. We have an appraisal with C.L. Welding and two 
11 
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appraisals of Big Foot Fly Shop, one of the building and land and the other 
of the business itself. We stipulated rather than have Mr. Cameron here as 
both parties used him. He s on call if we need him 
So Exhibit 1 would be the appraisal of the house, the property with 
five acres and the house. He appraised that as $236,500.00. 
Exhibit 2 would be the appraisal of the real estate and house and the 
lot on which the Big Foot Fly Shop is set. (unintelligible) Oh, SI 10,000.00 
-1 was wrong on the page - is his value on it. 
Exhibit 3 is the valuation of the business of Big Foot Fly Shop; 
basically things like inventory, accounts receivable, things like that. Its 
valued at $60,000.00. 
Exhibit 4 is the appraisal of C.L. Welding business; he valued that at 
$93,000.00. 
So we can deliver those to the court. 
THE COURT: O.K. Those are the exhibits of Dale Cameron 
and both parties agree those are accurate appraisal figures; is that correct? 
MR. ALLRED: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SNYDER: We - we agree that they are best lie can under 
the circumstances... 
(R:373 page 3. lines 13- page « 1, lines 1 
The issues ripe for resolution before the Court were also addressed at the 
commencement of trial as follows: 
THE COURT: Why don't we hear from counsel as to then the 
issues that are involved. I guess the primary issues are division of marital 
property; what might be marital property; the post nuptial agreement on the 
Fly shop. As I understand it, there's one child now that is under minority; 
is that correct? And I guess, attorney's fees, alimony. What else: 
MR. ALLRED That is about it. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. SNYDER: That's about it 
(R:373page5, lines 14-22) 
12 
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The Court in its findings of fact resolved certain issues that are pertinent to the 
overall issues of marital property division and alimony which have not been challenged 
on appeal. Mrs. Batty was awarded the care custody and control of their minor child 
subject to Mr. Batty's reasonable rights of visitation. (R: 275). Mr. Batty was ordered to 
pay child support in the monthly sum of $733.00. (R: 274). The parties marital home 
appraised at a value of $236,500.00 and at the time of trial there was existing a first 
mortgage with a balance of $26,694.78 and a second mortgage with a balance owing of 
$60,999.92. (R: 265). Mr. Batty is capable of and is earning SI 10,000.00 gross per year 
through C.L. Welding. (R: 264). Mrs. Batty is capable of and is earning $20,000.00 
gross income per year from the fly shop and other endeavors. (R: 264). 
The Court made additional findings of fact which are pertinent and for which the 
appellant does not take issue on appeal. 
14. Mrs. Batty's grandmother owned a home at 38 North 400 
West, Vernal, Utah. After the grandmother's death, Mrs. Batty's mother 
who owned four-fifths of the property allowed Mrs. Batty to use the 
grandmother's home for an art studio and fly shop. 
15. The parties through C.L. Welding, Inc. paid Ms. Batty's aunt 
$2,000.00 for the remaining one-fifth interest in that property and Mrs. 
Batty's mother gifted the remaining four-fifths of the property to the 
petitioner. 
16. Mrs. Batty has continued to sell fishing rods, tackle, and flies 
from that property and has named the business the Big Foot Fly Shop. 
There was a fire in 1997 that caused substantial damage. The building was 
13 
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rebuilt with the insurance proceeds. The parties also added an addition at a 
cost of $40,000.00. The $40,000.00 was part of the second mortgage < m 
the parties' home. (Findings of Fact 14-16, R: 264-265). 
The parties' home was acquired in June of 1977 which was purchased by Mrs. 
Batty's father and in turn the parties made payments on the home and purchased 
additional adjoining acreage throughout the parties' marriage. (R:373, page 30 Sine 7 to 
page ^ '"'., "-I ii, 
The first mortgage on the parties' marital home (at the time of trial) required a 
monthly payment of $589 per month (see Trial Exhibit 12) with an outstanding balance 
of $26,694.78. 
On January 31, 2001 the parties took out a second mortgage identified as a home 
equity line of credit in the amount of $75,000.00 with Zion's First National Bank. (Trial 
Exhibit 28). The second mortgage consisted of $40,000.00 to pay off improvements on 
Big Foot Fly Shop; approximately $15,000.00 for the purchase of a piano for their son, a 
purchase of a Mach I Mustang in the approximate amount of SI 2,000.00 and the 
payment of certain payroll expenses of C.L. Welding, Inc. (R:373, page 51 lines 1-15). 
The monthly obligation on the second mortgage is $780.00 per month (Trial Exhibit 12) 
and a balance owing as of the date of Trial of $60,999.92. The Court determined that the 
parties' equity in the home to be $148,805.30 which provides for $74,402.65 to each 
1 1 
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party. ($236,500.00 minus $60,999.92- second mortgage and minus §26,694.78- first 
mortgage, divided by 2). (See Decree of Divorce paragraph 6, R:272). The Court 
awarded the home to Mrs. Batty but ordered that she pay Mr. Batty his equity plus 5% 
per annum payable when the Petitioner remarries, sells the home or when the parties' 
daughter graduates from high school whichever event occurs first. In addition, Mrs. 
Batty was ordered to reimburse Mr. Batty for any principle reduction on the second 
mortgage based on payments he makes on the second mortgage. (See paragraph 6 of the 
Decree of Divorce, R:272). 
In 1980 the parties incorporated a welding business (C.L. Welding, Inc.) wherein 
the parties were each 50% shareholders in the business. (R:43, lines 5-21). Mr. Batty 
was the welder and Mrs. Batty was the bookkeeper (R:29, lines 1-24). The income 
generated from C.L. Welding, Inc. has been the parties' primary source of income 
throughout the marriage. (R:29, lines 23-24). 
The appraisal conducted by Dale Cameron and submitted as Trial Exhibit 4 valued 
the business of C.L. Welding, Inc. at $93,000.00 pursuant to an asset based formula. 
(Trial Exhibit 4). The appraiser determined that the more accurate method of valuation 
was the asset approach. (Trial Exhibit 4). At page 27 of the appraisal identified as Trial 
Exhibit 4 under the asset based formula approach, the appraiser stated: 
15 
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ASSET-BASED FORMULA 
The basic premise is straightforward. The tangible net worth oi the 
company is valued by determining the market value of the assets and 
making a deduction for debt, accounts payable and any other obligations 
the company owes. The resulting total is what the company is worth by the 
asset based formula. Typically, a judgment must also be made as to 
v\ hcthcr the company value can justify an allowance for intangible assets or 
good v ill In those cases where there are special licenses, patents, 
copyrights or secret/ proprietary formulas which are property of the 
company and intrinsic to the viability and profitability of the business, 
these intangible assets must also be valued and included. In the case of the 
subject business, no such special licenses, patents, copyrights, or 
secret/proprietary formulas were owned or included. 
The schedule of assets and liabilities was listed at page 28 (a copy of the schedule 
is attached hereto as addendum A) of the appraisal which also identifies that there was no 
component or added value to the appraisal associated with Mr. Batty's operational and 
welding skills. 
The Court in its ruling stated as follows: 
C.L. Welding: 
The Court will conclude, based on those differences and allocations, 
the entire value of the C.L. Welding business will be awarded to Mr. Batty. 
There is an appraised value on that business with its value of $93,000.00. 
I he entire award of C.L. Welding to Mr. Batty will compensate him for 
making the second mortgage payments on the balance of the home equity 
loan which is a second position on the home and real property. The 
Cameron appraisal of S93,000.00 on C.L. Welding assumes that Mr. Batty 
is an integral part of that business. It is through his welding skill and 
operational skills that give additional value to that business. Therefore, as 
16 
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a practical matter, the Court must discount the Cameron appraised value for 
the purpose of property division in this case. By awarding Mrs. Batty the 
entire fixtures and inventory in the Fly Shop, the Court feels justified in 
awarding the value of the C.L. Welding entirely to Mr. Batty. 
This would also compensate Mrs. Batty for Mr. Batty's assumption 
of the second mortgage, minus the $20,000.00 which he has already been 
given credit for toward the fly shop improvements. (R:248-249). 
The nature of the business of Big Foot Fly Shop is a store which primarily sells fly 
fishing equipment. (R:373, page 42, lines 6-8). 
Mrs. Batty became interested in tying flies at an early age (approximately age 12) 
and began tying flies and selling them to local businesses. (R:373, page 42, lines 8-23). 
After the parties were married, the business developed to the point where Mrs. Batty was 
selling the flies out of the trunk of her car. (R:373, page 43, lines 7-9). In 1991 Mrs. 
Batty opened the fly shop at its present location at 38 North 400 West, Vernal, Utah. 
(R:373, page 44, lines 5-13). Mrs. Batty's mother was the owner of four-fifths of the real 
property that she had acquired through an inheritance from her mother. (R:373, page 44, 
lines 19-21). The remaining one-fifth of the real property was owned by an aunt of Mrs. 
Batty's. (R:373, page 44, lines 19-21). The parties acquired the one-fifth interest from 
Mrs. Batty's aunt by payment of $2,000.00 to acquire that interest. (R:373, page 45, 
lines 13-17). The four-fifth interest owned by Mrs. Batty's mother was then gifted to 
17 
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Mrs. Batty. (R:373, page 45, lines 22-24). In 1997 there was an arson fire at the 
business and the business was rebuilt with insurance proceeds. (R:373, page 47, lines 3-
7). The buildings were also improved by borrowing $40,000.00 secured by the parties' 
home. (R:373, page 51, lines 1-4). Pursuant to the appraisals completed by Dale 
Cameron, the real property was appraised at $110,000.00 (Trial Exhibit 2) and the 
appraised value of the inventories and fixtures based upon an asset based formula (which 
is the same method used for valuing C.L. Welding) was appraised at $60,000.00. (Trial 
Exhibit 3). The Court determined that four-fifths of the real property was the separate 
property of Mrs. Batty received by gift through her mother and further that $21,000.00 
should be credited towards Mr. Batty which was one-half of the $2,000.00 purchase 
price and one half of the $40,000.00 improvements. (R:249). 
With regard to the distribution of assets, the marital home was valued and the 
equity evenly divided. ( R. 249). Mrs. Batty was obligated to pay Mr. Batty his share of 
the equity upon remarriage, sale of the home or the parties' daughter emancipation. ( R. 
249). In addition, Mrs. Batty was required to pay 5% interest to Mr. Batty's on his share 
of the equity. ( R. 249). Mrs. Batty was awarded the Big Foot Fly Shop (four-fifths of 
the real property was awarded to her as her separate property.) and the welding business 
of C.L. Welding was awarded to Mr. Batty. (R:249-250). The life insurance owned by 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the parties was not awarded to either party but rather it was ordered that the cash value in 
the policies would pay the premium until it ran out. (R:248). The penny stocks owned 
by the parties was equally divided. (R:248). Each of the parties were awarded the 
vehicles that were valued in their respective businesses. (R:247). The piano, two 
mustangs and Senoma truck were awarded to the parties' children. (R:247). The Mach I 
Ford Mustang, the boat and the bullet mustang were all ordered to be sold and applied to 
the second mortgage. (R:247). The remaining personal property of the marriage was not 
distributed but rather the court ordered the parties to try and work it out or to come back 
before the court. (R:247). 
With regard to the distribution of the debts of the marriage, Mrs. Batty was 
ordered to pay the first mortgage on the home of $26,694.78 payable in the monthly 
amount of S589.00 per month. ( R: 250; Petitioner's Tnal Exhibit 12). Mr. Batty was 
ordered to pay the second mortgage of $60,999.92 requiring a monthly payment of 
$780.00 but further it was ordered that he be reimbursed his principle payments at the 
time the equity is paid in the marital home and further the Court ordered that two 
mustangs and the parties' boat be sold and applied to the second mortgage obligation. 
(R: 249) The only other two obligations ordered by the Court for Mr. Batty to pay was 
the reimbursement of $734.24, being his share of one-half of the medical expenses for 
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the parties daughter and further was ordered to pay Mrs. Batty's attorney's fees. (R: 246-
247). 
With regard to the parties' respective needs and monthly expenses, Mrs. Batty 
submitted a financial declaration (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 12 a copy is attached as 
addendum B). Mr. Batty did not submit a financial declaration but did submit an 
accounting of the monthly expenses paid by C.L. Welding, Inc. which is Respondent's 
Trial Exhibit 25. (A copy is attached as addendum C). Trial Exhibit 25 is a 
combination of personal expenses and business expenses. (Trial Exhibit 25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties stipulated to the entry of the appraisals and the values assessed by 
Cameron and Associates. The Court allocated full value of the ongoing business of the 
Big Foot Fly Shop which appraisal was based upon an evaluation of the actual assets 
minus liabilities and arriving at its $60,000.00 value. The Court, however, in 
considering the value of C.L. Welding, Inc. discounted the value of the business claiming 
that a discount was appropriate because part of the $93,000 appraised value was based 
upon the welding skills and operational skills of Mr. Batty and further justified a 
discount by stating that a lower figure was justified because Mr. Batty was ordered to pay 
the second mortgage on the parties' home. The appraisal on C.L. Welding was very 
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specific in that it excluded any component of the valuation of the business for the very 
things the Court found reason to discount. Specifically the approach taken was an asset 
based approach and the appraiser specifically determined that there was no component of 
the asset based appraisal for the operational or welding skills of Mr. Batty. The 
attachments in the appraisal itself identifies each of the assets ( which are comprised of 
mostly tools and vehicles) and the value placed thereon which total the $93,000.00. (See 
addendum A). The discount given by the court (using the stipulated appraised values) 
gives Mr. Batty a $12,000 windfall that easily could have been offset with equity in the 
house. 
Although it appears throughout most of the ruling that Mr. Batty was going to be 
made ultimately responsible for the payment of the second mortgage, the ruling in one 
sentence provides that Mr. Batty would be reimbursed his principle payments in addition 
to his equity in the home. In reality, the Court was obligating Mr. Batty to be responsible 
for the interest component of the second mortgage but by reimbursing him his principle 
payments, the ultimate obligation for the second mortgage is paid out of the equity in the 
home; hence, equally paid by both Mr. and Mrs. Batty. 
The Trial Court also abused its discretion in only awarding $1,000.00 per month 
in alimony when the Court by its own finding determined that Mr. Batty's income per 
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month was $9,200.00 and Mrs. Batty's income was S 1,666.00. Although the Court 
ordered the $1,000.00 per month payment of alimony as an "income equalization 
concept," the alimony award does not come close to equalizing the parties income. 
Further there was no corresponding disproportionate allocation of assets or debts which 
might otherwise justify a lower award of alimony. 
Finally, there were a number of debts identified by Mrs. Batty in her financial 
declaration for which the Court made no determination or allocation among the parties. 




THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISCOUNTED 
THE APPRAISED VALUE OF C.L. WELDING 
Although the case law is quite clear that the Court has broad discretion in 
allocating the debts and assets of a marriage and that the Court is not obligated to exact a 
50/50 split of all of the marital assets, this case provides a quite different type of a 
scenario in that the parties specifically stipulated to the values of the three major assets of 
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the marriage, (i.e. the home at $236,500.00; the value of C.L. Welding, Inc. $93,000.00; 
the business enterprise of Big Foot Fly Shop $60,000.00 and the real property of Big 
Foot Fly Shop $110,000.00). The stipulation of the parties for the entry of the appraisals 
as Trial Exhibits and their acceptance of the values also accepts the basis upon which the 
appraiser made his valuation. Specifically C.L. Welding, Inc. was appraised at 
$93,000.00 based upon the specific market value of the assets of C.L. Welding, Inc. 
minus its liabilities. Counsel does not believe that there is a serious dispute between the 
parties that the Court appropriately awarded the assets and real property of the Big Foot 
Fly Shop to Mrs. Batty nor that the Court awarded C.L. Welding, Inc. to Mr. Batty. Nor 
does counsel believe that there is significant dispute between the parties over the fact that 
the marital home was awarded to Mrs. Batty subject to the payment to Mr. Batty of his 
equity. 
The difficulty Mrs. Batty has with the Court's discounting of C.L. Welding's 
appraised value is the basis upon which the Court relies in making such a determination. 
As set out in the Statement of Facts, the appraiser specifically stated that he was not 
adding any component of the appraised value for the operational and welding skills of 
Mr. Batty yet the Court used that very basis as the justification for discounting its 
appraised value. The Court additionally justifies a discounted value for the C.L. Welding 
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business based upon its assertion that a discount is justified by the obligation of Mr. 
Batty to pay the second mortgage which likewise would be okay with Mrs. Batty if the 
ruling of the Court truly obligated Mr. Batty to pay the second mortgage. Although Mr. 
Batty is ordered temporarily to make the payments on the second mortgage, he is 
specifically allowed reimbursement out of the equity of the home once their daughter 
turns 18 or graduates from high school or the home is sold or Mrs. Batty remarries. 
The Court easily and equitably could have offset the amount of equity owed in the 
home to Mr. Batty by the differences in the values between C.L. Welding, Inc. and the 
Big Foot Fly Company i.e. $12,000.00, or in other words the distribution of cash when 
one of the future events takes place referred to above. The $12,000 windfall in favor of 
Mr. Batty is based upon a clear misconception of the court as it relates to the asset based 
formula used by the appraiser. 
The Court's opinion is difficult to reconcile in other aspects. Mr. Batty is given a 
credit of $21,000.00 as against the real property owned by the Big Foot Fly Company. 
The basis for which the Court arrives at the $21,000.00 figure is that the Court 
determines that four-fifths of the value of the property was gifted to Mrs. Batty, the 
remaining one-fifth interest was purchased jointly by the parties for $2,000.00 and the 
parties made improvements to the property in the amount of $40,000.00 for a credit to 
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Mr. Batty of one-half or in other words $21,000.00. The flaw in the Court's rationale, 
however, is that the $40,000.00 referred to is not money the parties had and merely spent 
on the business but rather is borrowed money that is still owing and is not an asset of the 
marital estate but rather the $40,000.00 building improvement is offset with a $40,000.00 
liability that is part of the second mortgage on the home. 
No one has taken issue or appealed the Court's determination that four-fifths of 
the real property owned by the Big Foot Fly Company was given to Mrs. Batty as her 
separate property. Counsel has reviewed the file and transcript for some other means 
justifying the credit given of $21,000.00 and perhaps a better view may have been that if 
one looks at the appraised value of $110,000.00 that regardless of what the parties 
actually paid for their one-fifth interest that perhaps a better approach would have been 
that one-fifth of the appraised value equals $22,000.00 and consequently the Court's 
$21,000.00 credit to Mr. Batty is not particularly problematic. 
If one considers the accounting based upon the Court's ruling which in essence 
awards to Mrs. Batty $60,000.00 in value as the going concern for the Big Foot Fly 
Company plus S21,000.00 as the marital portion of the real property for a total of 
$81,000.00 and then compares it to Mr. Batty's marital asset in C.L. Welding, Inc. of 
$93,000.00 leaves a $12,000.00 offset, or in other words, Mr. Batty has received 
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$12,000.00 more of the marital estate than Mrs. Batty. The $12,000.00 equitably should 
be offset against the $74,402.65 which was ordered to be paid as Mr. Batty's share of the 
equity in the home. The alternative would be for the Court to follow its own justification 
in assuming that Mr. Batty was to pay the second mortgage (which by the way would be 
reduced by the value of two mustangs and a boat) and if in fact Mr. Batty was ordered to 
pay the second mortgage without offset or reimbursement would justify discounting the 
appraised value of C.L. Welding. 
The parties by stipulating to the values of the properties reasonably expected that 
they would be given full value of the appraised value as opposed to the Court arbitrarily 
discounting one of the assets without some offsetting factor in some other award. 
II 
THE ALLOCATION OF THE MARITAL ASSETS IS 
INTERTWINED IN THE COURT'S DETERMINATION OF 
ALIMONY. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
ALL FACTORS REQUIRED IN DETERMINING ALIMONY 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-35(8)(a) states: 
The Court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
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(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to an increase 
and the payors spouses skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Rehne v. Rehne, 974 P.2d 306 (1999 Utah Appeals 
41) states in pertinent part as follows: 
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial 
court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity 
of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; 
and, the length of the marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7){a){i)-(iv) 
(1998); Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see generally 
Quids v. Quids, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct.App.1998). "Failure to consider 
these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion," Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah Ct.App. 1988), resulting in reversal "unless 
pertinent facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Schaumherg v. 
Schawnberg 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). Moreover, the trial 
court must make detailed findings on all material issues, i.e. the Jones 
factors, which "should ... include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Stevens. ISA P.2d at 958 (citation omitted). 
[4] **7 As to the first factor, we stated in Baker that a trial court may not 
"merely restate [the recipient spouse's] testimony [regarding] her monthly 
expenses...." Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540. 546 (Utah Ct App.1993). The 
court must state that "the calculation of monthly expenses is reasonable" 
and must explain how it arrived at the monthly amount, or at least from the 
record, allow us to make this determination ourselves. 
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This court also set out the standard in Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, (Utah Ct. App. 
2000). 
"In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial 
court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity 
of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; 
and, the length of the marriage." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, % 6, 974 
P.2d 306; see Utah Code Ann. $ 30O-5(7)(a)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1999). [FN9] 
"If these factors have been considered, ' "we will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion." ' " Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 
946 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (omitting citations). 
No where in the ruling of the Court nor in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law or Decree of Divorce does the Court discuss the monthly expenses or needs of either 
of the parties. Mrs. Batty submitted a financial declaration as Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 12 
(attached as addendum B) which identifies monthly expenses of $4,741.00 plus in 
addition a list of several debts. The Court did not make a determination as to which ones 
were reasonable monthly expenses nor did the Court rule on a distribution of the debts 
identified in her financial declaration except for the first and second mortgage on the 
parties' marital home. To date the remaining debts identified on her financial declaration 
have remained undetermined by the court. 
In all fairness to the Court, Mr. Batty did not submit a financial declaration at all, 
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however, he did present Trial Exhibit 25 (attached as Addendum C) which identified the 
monthly expenses of C.L. Welding. It is clear, however, that based upon Trial Exhibit 25 
that some of the items are personal expenses and a number of the items are business 
expenses. The Court, however, did make a detemiination on a number of the factors 
required by the statutory provisions. Specifically, the Court found that Mrs. Batty's 
earning capacity or ability to produce income equaled $1,666.00 per month. The Court 
determined that Mr. Batty's monthly income to be $9,200.00 per month. 
The testimony was undisputed that the parties had been married 26 years at the 
time of the divorce and further that Mrs. Batty was awarded the custody of one minor 
daughter which would require support. 
The parties' daughter will graduate from high school and turn 18 as well, in May 
of 2008 at which time the parties' obligation to provide support at least pursuant to the 
statutory responsibilities will terminate. 
Further the testimony is uncontroverted that Mrs. Batty provided bookkeeping 
services for C.L. Welding while Mr. Batty performed the welding services and further 
that primarily Mrs. Batty has been a homemaker and caretaker for the children 
throughout the marriage. 
The transcript of the trial makes clear that neither of the parties are alleging that 
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they provided support while the payor spouse attended school during the marriage, nor 
have either party made an allegation of fault in determining alimony. 
Pursuant to subparagraph (d) of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5, the 
legislature provided that the Court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties respective standards of living. The Court in its ruling made a 
determination in awarding $1,000.00 per month in alimony that the Court was doing it as 
an "income equalization concept." The awarding, however, of $1,000.00 per month falls 
far short of equalizing the parties' respective incomes. Although there was substantial 
testimony with regard to the earnings or earning ability of each of the parties, the Court 
has made the determination that Mrs. Batty is capable of earning $1,666.00 per month 
and that Mr. Batty earns or is capable of earning $9,200.00 per month. That 
determination by the Court has not been challenged on appeal by either of the parties and 
equalization of the parties income is an easy calculation in that if one adds $9,200.00 per 
month plus $1,666.00 per month the parties combined gross incomes would total 
$ 10,866.00 per month which when divided equally between the parties would produce a 
gross monthly income for each of them of $5,433.00. Which in turn would equal an 
alimony payment by Mr. Batty to Mrs. Batty of $3,767.00 per month (ie. She earns 
$ 1,666 per month from her own employment). Both of the parties would have equal 
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gross income and consequently the tax consequences for both parties would be equal and 
each of them would have equal net disposable income. 
It would appear that since Mrs. Batty is the custodial parent and is incurring the 
cost of the parties' minor daughter that it would justify an increase in more than half of 
the parties' disposable income not a decrease as is the case in the matter at hand. The 
parties' daughter, however, will only be in Mrs. Batty's care for two more years which is 
a particularly short period of time in relationship to the 26 years that the parties have 
actually been married. 
Some of the other factors that the Court might have considered at trial in making 
the decision to leave more of the disposable income on Mr. Batty's side would have been 
if the Court had made the decision to give a substantially larger portion of the marital 
assets to Mrs. Batty. Such is not the case in this matter as set out above. In reality the 
Court gave Mrs. Batty, based upon the stipulated appraised values of the assets, a smaller 
S12,000 smaller portion of the marital assets. Also interestingly enough, the remaining 
personal property of the marital estate which is not included in either of the businesses 
was either ordered to be sold and applied to the second mortgage; or was awarded to the 
parties' children. All of the remaining personal property was left undistributed for the 
parties to work out between themselves. 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Another factor that the Court may consider in arriving at the decision to leave a 
larger portion of the disposable income in Mr. Batty's care would be if the Court ordered 
a substantial portion of the marital debt to be assumed by Mr. Batty. Again such is not 
the case in this matter. The only debts the Court assessed in this matter is the obligation 
for Mrs. Batty to pay the first mortgage on the home, that Mr. Batty pay the $780.00 per 
month second mortgage on the home subject to him being reimbursed the amount of any 
principle reduction in the second mortgage payable at the time the parties' minor 
daughter eurns 18 or graduates from high school or upon the remarriage or sell of the 
home. In addition, the Court obligated Mr. Batty to pay S738.24 to reimburse Mrs. Batty 
for one-half of the medical expenses; the payment of Mrs. Batty's attorney's fees; the 
payment of $ 1,000.00 per month in alimony and the payment of S733.00 in child 
support. 
An accounting is provided as follows as to the current income and obligations of 
the parties with the parties' minor daughter residing with Mrs. Batty as presently ordered 
by the court: 
Mrs. Batty 
Monthly income $ 1,666.00 
Alimony 1,000.00 
Contribution towards 
minor child support -133.00 
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(however, Mr. Batty will be reimbursed 
the principle portion of this amount as 
explained above) 
before payment of taxes 
One additional component the Court might consider, is that the foregoing amounts 
do not provide for Mr. Batty a home to reside in. Mr. Batty testified as follows: 
Q: What do you reasonably expect would cost you to live in a 
home that would be comparable to the one that you use to live in? 
A: Comparable to the one I use to live in? Or one that would be 
suitable for living standards? It is going to be close to $800-900. (R373: 
lines 16-21). 
Even if one gave Mr. Batty the benefit of the doubt and provided a home for him 
at $900 per month which is his own estimate would leave for him $5,787.00 of 
disposable income before taxes compared to Mrs. Batty's $1,944.00. 
The inequity of the Court's alimony determination becomes even more apparent 
when one considers the circumstances once the parties' daughter turns 18 and graduates 
from high school in two years in May of 2008. Assuming the same levels of income that 
the Court has determined at this time the accounting would be as follows: 
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Mrs. Batty's monthly income SI,666.00 
Payment of alimony K000.00 
Gross monthly income prior to taxes $2,666.00 
Mr. Batty monthly income $9,200.00 
Less alimony 1.000.00 
Disposable income before taxes $8,200.00 
In addition, Mr. Batty will have received his equity in the home of $74,402.65 
plus 5% interest from the entry of the Decree of Divorce. In addition, not only will Mr. 
Batty not have the monthly obligation on the second mortgage but will also be 
reimbursed the principle payments that he has made to date on the second mortgage. Mr. 
Batty will no longer have a child support obligation nor has Mr. Batty been assigned any 
other marital debt obligations. On the other hand, Mrs. Batty at that time will have to 
either sell the marital home or will have to refinance the home for an additional amount 
of money to cover the $74,402.65 to repay equity, plus 5%, plus the principle payments 
on the second mortgage if it is her desire to stay in the marital home. Based upon the 26 
year marriage where Mrs. Batty has primarily been a stay at home mom canng for the 
children, it would be unfair on its face for Mr. Batty to have an equal portion of all of the 
assets, allocation of no debts of the marriage and a monthly disposable income of 
$8,200.00 while Mrs. Batty is required to subsist on $2,666.00. 
In the event that the court were to equalize the parties incomes ( at least after all of 
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the children have reached majority) by awarding alimony of S3,767 then court's failure 
to look at the parties reasonable living expenses might be less problematic. As set out 
above Mrs. Batty's financial declaration is attached as Addendum B and Mr. Batty's 
monthly expenses for C.L. Welding is attached as Addendum C. The portions of the trial 
transcript which address monthly expenses have been copied and are attached as 
addendum D. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the stipulated values set out in the appraisal for the marital home, the 
Big Foot Fly Shop and C.L. Welding, Inc., it is an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
District Court to discount the value of C.L. Welding on the basis that a discount is 
merited due to Mr. Batty's welding and operational skills when the appraisal specifically 
indicates that no value has been added for said skills. Mrs. Batty should be awarded an 
offset against Mrs. Batty's equity in the marital home in the amount of $12,000.00 or in 
the alternative for an order requiring the District Court to make further findings 
justifying why the lower amount should be considered. 
For this Court to reverse the determination of District Court and enter an award of 
alimony based upon a 26 year marriage by equally dividing the parties' combined gross 
income between them and further to take into consideration during the period until May 
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of 2008 while their daughter resides with the Petitioner that she be granted more than 
one-half of the combined gross incomes. 
In the alternative for an order of the Court remanding the matter to the District 
Court to enter findings regarding the monthly needs and expenses of the parties and to 
adjust alimony accordingly. In addition, if the Court were to determine that an equitable 
resolution was to equally divide the combined gross incomes, then Mrs. Batty is more 
than willing to pay the second mortgage on the parties' home. 
Mrs. Batty was awarded her attorney's fees in the Trial Court and would request 
that the costs and fees also be awarded for the appeal. 
DATED this Z f day of Wjfl\ 2006. 
MICHAEL K. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of VWh\ 2006,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Kent E. Snider, Esq. 
Snider, Coggins & Larreau, P.C. 
289-24th Street #150 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY 
LORI D. BATTY, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
CLARK L. BATTY, 
Respondent 
Name: Lori D. Batty 
Address: 38 North 400 West 
Vernal, Utah 84 0.7! 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 024800017 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Statement of Income and Expenses 
Gross monthly income from salaries, wages, 
tips, overtime etc. $ 800.00 
Monthly Income from all other sources (sheep) 
Child support and alimony 
Less deductions for: 
Taxes and FICA $ 
Insurance $ 
Retirement $ 
Credit Union $ 
Savings Plan $ 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 
Net Monthly Income (Take Home Pay) 
Monthly Expenses 
10 . 00 
9 
$ o 
$ 8 8 0 . 0 0 
1 s t Mor tgage Payment 
) nd 2na Mortgage Payments 
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Laundry and Cleaning 
Medical, Dental, Glasses 
Medical Insurance 
Car Payment 
Car expense, include insurance 
Installment Payments (complete schedule) 
Entertainment 
Incidentals (grooming, alcohol, tobacco, 
donations, including tithing) 
T.J. Mission 









































LIST OF DEBTS 
Creditor 
ZIONS BANK 
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C. L. WELDING, INC ASSET/LIABILITY LIST 
CURRENT ASSETS: 
CASH 4,587 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AT YEAR END 2003 SALES/12 26,018 
INVENTORY & SUPPLIES, WELDING ROD, OTHER 3,500 
OTHER ASSETS: 
1991 DODGE WELDING TRUCK, BED, WINCH 8,500 
FLAT BED TRAILER 800 
CAMP TRAILER 8,000 
9 7 LINCOLN WELDER 3,000 
LITTLE WELDER 2,000 
WELDER 1,000 
2000 DODGE TRUCK 25,400 
1970 WELDING TRUCK 2,500 
99 FORD RANGER 8,000 
COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIPMENT 1,000 
WELDING TOOLS, PLASMA CUTTER, GRINDERS, TORCH 
SETS, PIPE VISES, PIPE STANDS, ALUM, PIPE WRENCHES, 
HYDRAULIC WELL HEAD TESTER, LEADS, LAYOUT TOOLS, 
HAND TOOLS HAMMERS, PORTA POWER, IMPACT TOOLS, 
SOCKETS, PROPANE BOTTLES, UMBRELLA, HOIST 5 WINCH, 
WELDING BED AT HOUSE, WELLHEAD HOOKS, CHAINS 
& BOOMERS, WORK LIGHTS, PROPANE HEATERS, 
HEAVY EXTENSION CORDS, C-CLAMPS, ETC. 31,500 
TOTAL ASSETS 
LIABILITIES 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE ~ & CURRENT LIABILITIES 20,235 
LONG TERM DEBT 12,684 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
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MONTHLY EXPENSES 
-riV7\l>^lINv* -
$ 1,668.52 Home Mortgage / Rent 
Taxes 




Si ,839.00 TOTAL 
U11UTLBS 
$3 5.00 Electricity 
$150.00 Heating 
$70 ;00 Water & Sewer L &PI 












Clothing & shoes 
Medical & Dental 
Recreation 
I lair Cuts 
Travel 









Gas & oil 
Maintenance 












$200,00 Allowance for TJ mission 
$795.00 TOTAL 
INSURANCE 
$210.00 Life insurance 
$569,00 Health Insurance 




$200.00 Credit can* payments 
$1,851.00 Pay Roll 
$695.50 pay 941 
$144.00 UT State tax com. 
$7.50 UT DEW. work force 
$105.00 Worker Comp, 
$3,603.00 TOTAL 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSE 
. PAYED BY CLWELDINO 
$11,303.00 
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MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Lori's Alimony $750.00 
Child support $473.00 
INSURANCE 
Life insurance $3,15 
TRANSPORTATION 
Installment payments 
Bank loan payment $203.79 
FoTdCredit $448.59 
TOTAL $1,878.53 
PAYED BY PERSONAL CHECKING 
Clark Batty 
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MR. SNIDER: Subject to my looking at it and reserving 
my right to objection. 
Q (By Mr. Allred) I want to show you Exhibit 12, a 
Financial Declaration, and a copy for the Court. Do you 
recognize Exhibit 12? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q What is Exhibit 12? 
A It's a list of - it's a Financial Declaration and a 
list of debts. 
Q Now on there you're listing $800 income, where does 
that come from? 
A From the Fly Shop in salary and trades and income that 
the Fly Shop's made. 
Q Which will be, what, 9600 a year? 
A Yes, I hope so. 
Q So it's consistent with your hope for 10,000 this 
coming year? 
A Correct. 
Q That's a little higher than is reflected on your tax 
return? 
A Yes, because they took out the depreciation. 
Q Okay. It also shows $80 from sheep. 
A Yes, I have -
Q - to be about another $1,000? 
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Q What do you do with sheep? 
A I traded for some sheep so I've got 14 ewes and 1 buck 
and I - I only had one lamb that was stillborn this year and 
they've all done well and hopefully they'll be ready for sell 
soon. 
Q Okay. And then on expenses we've got first and second 
mortgages, that's what we've been talking about on the house? 
A Correct. 
Q Turn over to the second page list of debts showing the 
first mortgage of 26,694; is that about what you knew was owed on 
it? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Who has been making the payment under the temporary 
order? 
A Clark has out of CL Welding. 
Q And that's tied to the purchase of the home and 
improvements? 
A Correct. 
Q Then the second mortgage -
MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, I'm going to object. First of 
all, it was leading; and two, it is false. It's leading. 
THE COURT: Well, I have heard the testimony from her 
about what it was for. That's what it was for. Just - I guess 
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we'll just delete Mr. Allred's comment -
MR. SNIDER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: - because it was — it's been testified 
about. 
Q (By Mr. Allred) Then the second mortgage - that's the 
one we talked about earlier - the 75,000 that was taken out. 
A Correct. And that's - that was the balance that was 
existing as of current, I think, I believe. 
Q Okay. That went for a variety of sources we talked 
about. 
A That's correct. 
Q And who's been making that payment? 
A CL Welding has been. 
Q Telephone, that's what you've been accruing monthly on 
- there at your house? 
A Yes. CL Welding has been paying for the phone bill 
until about two weeks and it was disconnected. 
Q Property taxes and insurance; what's that on? 
A That's on the home. 
Q So your insurance and taxes are not included in any of 
the mortgages? 
A No, it isn't. 
Q Food, clothing, laundry, cleaning, medical, dental, are 
those all the things that you're - average of what you occur on a 
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MR. SNIDER: Objection, your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear you. 
MR. SNIDER: Again, he's leading. 
THE COURT: Well, it's illustrative. 
Q (By Mr. Allred) Now, you've got medical insurance. 
Let's talk about that. Do you have medical insurance? 
A On just Jessica and myself. We couldn't get TJ 
insured, he's still on the State uninsurable list. 
Q Is there also insurance through CL Welding? 
A Yes, there is. 
Q Who's covered on that? 
A I believe all five of us are, or all four of us, Clar 
Lori, TJ, and Jessica. 
Q Once divorced you're probably off of that? 
A Yeah. And right now we've acquired this - the 
insurance at CL Welding -
Q That was going to be my - let me -
A Okay. 
Q - ask you a question first. So why have you acquired 
your own insurance? 
A CL Welding's insurance has $5,000 deductible per 
occurrence so basically the insurance we never received any 
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benefits from it. The policy I have is a Blue Cross Blue Shield 
policy. It has a co-pay of $5 on prescriptions and $15 on office 
calls, and it has paid where in the past I've had to pay for 
everything out of pocket so I feel it's fairly good insurance. 
Q Will it continue to cover you after your divorce? 
A Yes, it will. 
Q You've got a car payment of 251, what are you making -
what car are you making payments on? 
A It's a 1999 Ford truck. 
Q And who has been paying that under the temporary order? 
A I have been. 
Q Is that a vehicle you drive? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And then we've got a list of installment payments. 
What are you presently paying installments on? 
A I was left with a credit card payment; one was for 
carpet that is in the home, another one is for car parts - well, 
the other two are for a lot of car parts and just general use 
credit cards that we had. And the one credit card now has the 
majority of the lawyer fees on it. 
Q Which one is that? 
A That one is - it's the Key Bank Account. 
Q Are there any other debts that have increased since you 
separated? The Key Bank one you say for legal fees; anything 
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else you've incurred? 
A Dale Cameron that has to do with the appraisal; Turner 
Lumber, in 2004 we built a shed and that's the balance that I owe 
on the shed for materials we bought at Turner Lumber. And then 
TJ, the property tax he's helped - he has paid the property tax 
for the last two years. 
Q Why has he paid the property taxes? 
A Basically funds have been tight and he's helped me out. 
Q What's your agreement with him? 
A We need to get it paid back. He'd like me to have it 
paid back by the time he gets home from his mission. 
Q You've also got TJ mission up there on your list of 
expenses; what's that? 
A That's - the 375 is what the church would like us to 
pay to send TJ on his mission. 
Q Has there been a decision between you and Clark as to 
how you're going to do that? 
A I haven't talked to him, but on his expenses he did not 
list the full amount to send him on the mission. He only listed 
partial of it of $200. 
Q Do you believe Exhibit 12 accurately reflects the 
income and expenses you have, particularly if you were requested 
to pay those two first - two mortgages on the house? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. ALLRED: I'd move to introduce Exhibit 12. 
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MR. SNIDER: No objection. 
THE COURT: The Court will receive 12. 
Q (By Mr. Allred) Have you incurred legal fees in this 
action? 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q Have you been able to keep those paid? 
A With the help of my credit card. They've been applied 
to the MasterCard account. 
Q And you've run that up to 12,000? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q We've been functioning under a temporary order; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q I'm going to show you Exhibit 13. (Inaudible) What is 
Exhibit, is it 13? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q What is - what is Exhibit 13? 
A This is a list of expenses that I've incurred that I 
have not been reimbursed for. 
Q The first one is medical costs. 
A Correct. And the total is one-half, with the exception 
of Clark told that he would - TJ he'd pay one visit to the 
hospital in full. 
Q Have you given Mr. Batty copies of these debts? 
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declaration, that you filed in 2002 when you still had TJ living 
at home and Brooke living at home and Jessica living at home. 
Because by your own testimony -
A I'm thinking we had ten days left with Brooke at home -
living at home. 
Q Okay. Brooke actually moved out - Brooke got married 
on the 26th of April, 2002; correct? 
A Yeah. She had ten days so we didn't figure her in, I 
don't think. 
Q You filed this Financial Declaration -
A In April. 
Q In April. And you basically project that your . 
utilities with four people living at home were $379.76 per month; 
is that correct? 
A Yeah. I called the utilities and -
Q Huh? 
A I called the utilities and got a years worth of bills 
and averaged them out, divided by 12. 
Q Okay. Divided by 12. That was in 2002 when you had 
four people at home. Now your Financial Declaration, number 12, 
that you filed with the court you list - now you've only have 
projected two people at home, you and Jessica, $450 a month. 
A That's - what I can say. Prices have went up. 
Q You have less people living at home, less food to feed 
them -
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A Food is other line. 
Q - less clothing to buy - we're going to get to that in 
just a second - and utilities are going up? That's - that's your 
- that's the only way you can justify the difference between 379 
and 450? 
A 379 - the utilities are the same no matter who lives 
there, how many people live there, you still have to pay -
Q Number - next one down; clothing for kids. Okay. You 
list in your clothing $150 per month. That's what you estimate 
back in 2002. That's with four of you living there. Now you 
list clothing 150 bucks a month. That's with only two people 
living there. 
A Well, sir. I would say the second answer is more 
accurate. 
Q Food for kids. You list food in your thing at $450 a 
month. You list food for just you and Jessica, because that's 
what you projected - at 400 bucks a month. Now I've got seven 
kids, I know that it doesn't cost the same to feed four as it 
does two. 
MR. ALLRED: Objection. I'd move to strike the 
testimony as to counsel's living expenses. 
MR. SNIDER: Okay. I'll rephrase the question. I 
apologize. 
Q (By Mr. Snider) So can you explain to the court why all 
of a sudden you lose two kids and the amount of food that it 
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costs only goes down 50 bucks a month? 
A Well, number one, we projected it without Brooke being 
in there so it was the three, not kids, but three of us; TJ, me 
and Jessica. Because Brooke was going to get married in ten 
days, I didn't want to say for the whole next however long that I 
was going to feed her so we - actually as soon as TJ leaves on 
his mission there will just be two of us. 
Q Correct. So is it going to go down? 
A I just - that's what I project from the records we've 
been keeping. It's going to cost. 
Q Car payment you list initially at $244.42 per month. 
What is that .for? What vehicle is that for? 
A That's for the Ford '99 pickup I drive. 
Q F-250? 
A Uh huh. (Affirmative) 
Q That you pay out of your business? 
A No, I don't pay that. I pay that out of my personal 
account. 
Q It's listed as a business asset. You depreciated it as 
part of your income tax return. 
A It's a sole proprietorship, sir. 
Q So are we deducting - 'cuz I can look in your expenses 
for your business, are we deducting the payments twice? We're 
taking out of our business and we're also sitting over here and 
saying it's part of my normal expenses? 
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A It comes out of my personal checking account, sir. You 
can check with Zions Bank if you'd like. 
Q How about your car expenses, including insurance? It's 
$400 a month is what you list now. It's 475 back then, but 
you're not paying for Brooke and you're not paying for TJ; is 
that correct? 
A I wasn't paying for Brooke when we made this up, sir. 
I keep explaining to you there was just TJ, Jessica, and I. 
Q Okay. 
A Insurance went up or - I just got quotes from Clark 
Hall for insurances. 
Q Your expenses in 2001 you show repair and maintenance 
for vehicles - this is in your Financial Statement, number 3 -
part of your appraisal you list $4,420 a year for repairs and 
maintenance, but yet you're claiming -
A Where's that at, sir? 
Q That's in plaintiff number 3. If you don't have that, 
I've got a copy, the original the court has. 
A Well, I wouldn't know what I stated if I don't have a 
copy. 
Q What I'm trying to get to is are you double dipping? 
Are you claiming that the stuff you're paying and require for 
monthly expenses for your business you're also listing as your 
personal expenses? 
THE COURT: Why don't you I'm confused, too. Direct 
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THE COURT: What do you need? 
THE WITNESS: A drink of water. 
MR. SNIDER: Thank you again. 
Q (By Mr. Snider) Mr. Batty, I'm going to show you what's 
been marked as Exhibit Number 25 for the second time, and ask if 
you can identify that document? Do you recognize that? 
A Yes. Monthly expenses for CL Welding. 
Q That's how much you're paying out of CL Welding; is 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now there's things in here like clothing for the kids, 
the mortgage on the first and second mortgage, plus your rent. 
A Yes. 
Q So there's CL Welding's and then you break them down in 
to -
A All this right here is paid out of CL Welding. 
Q Okay. Is this above and beyond the $32,000 you take a 
year as income, or is this part of it? 
A This is above and beyond the 32,000. 
Q You pay your child support out of the -
A Out of the personal. 
Q Out of your personal account? 
A Yes. 
Q How about your monthly expenses for your rent? 
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A I pay it out of CL Welding. 
Q Your - this $1600 a month that you list here for 
mortgage, rent, taxes, how much of that is for you? 
A $300. 
Q You pay $300 a month for lot rent? 
A For rent. 
Q Are you renting a trailer? 
A Yes, I'm renting a trailer. 
Q Describe for the court what kind of trailer you live 
in. 
A It's a two bedroom, two bathroom, living room, and a 
small dining room, and a kitchen, and a little tiny utility room. 
Q Compared to your - compare it to your home that you 
were living in before you separated? 
A On a scale from 1 to 10 it's like a 1, the home is a 
10. 
Q Is it the standard of living that you enjoyed while you 
were married? 
A No. 
Q Is it something that you could continue to live in on a 
long term basis? 
A No. 
Q Could you bring your children there and raise them and 
24 feel comfortable raising them under the circumstances? 
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Q Why do you live there? 
A It puts me out away from town. It's - it puts me in 
the same ward as my brothers and the family. 
Q Is that the best you can afford in the current 
situation? 
A No. 
Q Can you afford a little better? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You're not asking the court to assess your 
income - or assess your living expenses at 300 bucks a month, are 
you? Pretty hard? 
A I don't understand that guestion. 
Q Right now you're paying $300 a month for a trailer. 
A Yes. 
Q What do you reasonably expect it would cost you to live 
in a home that would be comparable to the one you used to live 
in? 
A Comparable to the one I used to live in? 
Q Or one that would be suitable for living standards. 
A It's going to be close to 8 or $900. 
Q Okay. The utilities that you list here, electricity, 
heating, water, cable, are those all for you personally, not the 
shop? 
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A These a r e f o r t h e - t h e w a t e r and t h e sewer i s L o r i ' s . 
Q So y o u ' r e p a y i n g h e r w a t e r and sewer a t h e r home? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Cable for your trailer? 
A Yes. 
Q How about the electricity? 
A Yes. 
Q Don't write on that document. 
A Oh, okay. Yes. 
Q The heating at 150 bucks a month, is that for the 
trailer? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. That doesn't - those aren't your expenses for 
the shop then, those are all your personal expenses? 
A The phone bill is expenses for the shop - for my 
business. 
Q Do you have a phone at your house? 
A No. 
Q Do you have a phone at your shop or do you just have a 
cell phone? 
A I don't have a shop. I just have a mobile cell phone. 
Q Okay. And so the 350 a month is what you're paying for 
your mobile phone? 
A It was also paying Lori's bill - phone bill, too. 
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Q You were paying her phone bill until when? 
A Until I didn't receive any more bills from UBET. 
Q So after you stopped receiving the phone bill you 
stopped the phone bill? 
A I didn't have a - Jessica brought - last time I got a 
bill my daughter Jessica brought it down and I paid it. 
Q Okay. 
A But I haven't received any more bills. 
Q You haven't refused to pay the phone bill have you? 
A No. 
Q Are you court ordered to pay the phone bill? 
A • No. 
Q Why have you been paying the phone bill then? 
A So I could talk to my daughter. 
Q And now that's been turned off? 
A Yes. 
Q The $250 a month for food, is that just for you? You 
don't have anyone else that lives with you, do you? 
A Yeah, it's just for me. 
Q Okay. Now it listed on here for children you've got 
clothing $50 bucks a month. You're paying for the kids clothing? 
A I gave my daughter Jessica money to go - she's gone to 
St. George and got clothes. 
Q And that's above and beyond the child support that you 
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were o r d e r e d t o pay? 
A Yes. 
Q How about the $100 a month for lessons; is that for 
Jessica and TJ? 
A That is for Jessica. 
Q 20 bucks a month for allowance. .I don't suppose that's 
for you, is that for Jessica? 
A That's for Jessica. 
Q The 375 a month for a mission, that's for TJ? 
A Yes. 
Q And if Lori lists that also you don't both have to pay 
375 a month, do you? 
A No. 
Q Have you already made arrangements for that 375 a month 
be paid through your ward? 
A Yes. 
Q The $200 month allowance for TJ's mission, what's that? 
A I put that in there. I don't know if he needs cash on 
top of that or -
Q So that's something you're budgeting in with the idea 
you may have to pay some additional monies for TJ? 
A Yes. 
Q And he's going where? I'm sorry. 
A To St. Petersburg, Russia. 
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Q So we d o n ' t know i f t h a t ' s an e x p e n s i v e m i s s i o n or a 
cheap m i s s i o n , we d o n ' t know? 
A I do no t know. 
Q Okay. The medical and dental 150 you list there, is 
that for health insurance or is that for medical bills? Nope, I 
guess that's for - that's for medical and dental, that would be 
for actual bills. What is that? 
A For medical and dental? 
Q Uh huh. (Affirmative) 
A That's what I owed - I paid dental bills and I've been 
working on getting it paid off. 
Q Are you still paying for Jessica's glasses also? 
A No. I haven't - I paid - I have paid for some to 
Seitz, but I don't remember - Seitz Optical, but I don't remember 
what that was. 
Q Health insurance of 569 a month, that's for the family; 
is that correct? Under insurance. 
A You're skipping around. That is - that's health 
insurance what was set up when we were together. It's still the 
same health insurance. I have not changed it. I have not 
changed a thing on it. 
Q This Mustang restoration for 500 bucks, is that for you 
or for one of the kids? 
A That is for TJ. 
Q It's a Mustang that's being restored? 
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Q You also have a Mustang that's being restored for 
Brooke, too? 
A It is. It's done. I think - I don't have any idea 
what she's done with it. 
Q The installment payments of 456, what's that? 
A That's the payment on that Dodge Dually. 
Q Okay. That's part of your business. That's the Dodge 
that you drive as part of your business? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Batty, are you refusing to pay Ms. Batty alimony? 
A No. 
Q You understand she needs support? 
A Yes. 
Q On a temporary basis you've been paying her 750 bucks a 
month; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And child support of about 473 a month? 
A Yes. 
Q Now in your interrogatory - actually in Ms. Batty's 
interrogatories she reports that you made in x99 about $63,000 
joint, is that about right? 
A When? 
Q '99. 
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